Dramaticity as essence: structural-phenomenological analysis of hysteria A dramaticidade como essência: uma análise fenômeno-estrutural da histeria

O presente artigo tem como objetivo explorar a histeria pela descrição em psicopatologia fenomenológica, em especial a partir das características da sua espacialidade. São buscadas, na revisão de autores clássicos da psicopatologia fenomenológica, tais como Kraus e Dörr, as características da espacialidade da histeria, utilizando os conceitos de espaço claro e espaço escuro, sintonia e esquizoidia de Minkowski, e os conceitos de proporção antropológica, horizontalidade e espacialidade de Binswanger. A revisão desses autores permite afirmar que a histeria é mais facilmente observada no que diz respeito à espacialidade da consciência. O histérico vive essencialmente no espaço claro e horizontal da experiência de mundo, de modo que sua forma de ser-no-mundo está imbuída de dramaticidade, ou seja, de ação e movimento, intensidade e atuação, admiração e repulsa. Essa forma de ser não é patológica, mas pode se tornar problemática em razão de uma desproporção antropológica.


Introduction
Hysteria first entered the field of medicine in the 4th century BC, with Hippocrates (Trillat, 1991). Despite its multiple, subsequent semantic variants, the term has never fallen out of favor, being applied today in psychiatry and psychology practice. In its common usage in the Western world, the term has had a judgmental connotation that, however arguable, persists to this day (Charbonneau, 2007). The understanding of hysteria has changed in different periods and cultures (Merleau-Ponty, 1999), and our observations are no exception. From a contemporary historical and cultural perspective, these observations will be expounded upon here in an attempt to clarify what-beyond the common pejorative connotation of the term-presents as hysteria at clinica l psychiatric and therapeutic practices.
Given the confusion often posed when designating it an existential possibility or a pathology, the term hysteria has been excised from official nosographies of mental disorders, but its core meaning still lingers under the guise of other names: hysterica l personality disorder, dissociative disorders, somatic symptom disorders (Associatio n, 2014;Saúde, 1994). The nosological concepts and classifications of hysteria available in diagnostic manuals or psychology textbooks (Association, 2014;Saúde, 1994;Trilla t, 1991) promote further confusion by failing to pinpoint its core trait, instead offering different concepts in response to the multiple manifestations of the phenomeno n-a multiplicity that has precluded a clearer grasp of what hysteria might actually be. This difficulty has sparked our interest in investigating the central trait of hysteria, embracing a spatial description of better proportionate structures in this anthropological experientia l field (Broussolle, 2014;Charbonneau, 2007;Crommelinck, 2014;Kraus, 1987;Kurcgant, 2010;North, 2015;Ramadam, 1981Ramadam, , 1985. Investigations in the field of phenomenological psychopathology often frustrate readers seeking explanations for abnormal behaviors, whether via metapsychology or studies about the effects of biochemical and neuroanatomic factors on the brain. This, however, is not the endeavor of phenomenology-guided psychopathology. What phenomenology proposes to do-and which is by no means a simple task-is to shed light on a phenomenon of clinical psychology and psychiatry by seeking an anthropological essence that can support an empathic encounter with patients and thus allow us to better understand them. Phenomenological psychopathology can reveal "what psychiatrists have always known, although not necessarily knowing they know it" (Tatossian, 2006).
Elucidating the core trait of hysteria requires, first and foremost, delimiting our field of study. Since its inception, phenomenology has sought to describe human perceptual experience (Husserl, 2012a). The social perception of what hysteria is can yield a more accurate description of the phenomenon, as this view is less biased by theoretical constructs. However, this type of socially shared perception has hitherto never been described. Therefore, our task involves a descriptive, phenomenologically oriented effort-descriptive because we shall attempt to reveal what is understood by hysteria; phenomenological because this description will evolve from the postulates of phenomenology, so as to underscore the spatiality of hysteria.
Let us start by defining two key concepts our discussion will hinge upon: essence and structure. Subsequently, we shall describe hysterical individuals in terms of their interpersonal experience, drawing on the classic literature. This will be followed by the notions of spatiality as per Binswanger and Minkowski, and the concepts of syntony and schizoidism as defined by Minkowski. These steps will lay the foundation for describing the phenomenon that presents in our practice as hysteria. With this effort, we intend not only to facilitate the clinical identification of hysteria, but also to contribute toward psychopathological approaches that aim to address the core of this mode of being-in-theworld.

Essence and structure
The concepts of essence and structure, as complementary elements, will allow us to better describe the phenomenon of hysteria. Messas posits that essences are "a priori general elements of the experiences lived by human species"-i.e., they are permanent, irreducible anthropological modes of existence shared by humans, whereas structures, corresponding to conditions of existential possibilities unique to each individual, are characterized by continuous change (Messas, 2010). Structures are individual and irreproducible, grounded in a historical past and projecting into an open future.
Structures have a phenomenological foundation: each of us is an aperture to the world, so that what can be observed is the relationships of the individual with himself, others, and the world (Messas, 2010). This definition carries with it the phenomenologica l reduction of the transcendental subject and the relationship between noesis and noema (Husserl, 2012b). The structure therefore works descriptively in the ontological field.
Moreover, this aperture to the world is amenable to description in the phenomenal field of consciousness as regards temporality, spatiality, intersubjectivity, and corporeality.
Although a structure is a condition of unique existential possibility, it is possible to describe it to the point of evidencing a common essence with other structures. Such is the complementarity between structure and essence that the latter manifests in the former, and thus can take the most diverse behavioral forms. Considering these features, Messas (2010) posits that the diagnostic method should comprise a three-step pendular approach: first, based on the patient's behaviors, a description can be obtained of the phenomena experienced by the individual; secondly, phenomenological reduction should reveal the essence, the irreducible core of the phenomenon; finally, revisiting the structure should allow us to observe how the essence acts in this mode-of-being.

Interpersonality in hysteria
According to Jaspers, cited by Kraus (1987), "instead of being content with the capacities given by nature and the concrete possibilities of life, hysterical personalities see the need to appear to themselves and to others as more than they are and to experience more than they are capable of experiencing" (p. 82). This concerns the roles we play during our lives, about which Kraus (1987) writes: "hysterical personalities are always playing roles"; "they [...] are oriented by their respective moment, by their needs [...] and, owing to so much role-playing, they end up not knowing who they are." Other authors with a psychoanalytic background have defined the hysterical personality in terms of an "identification that does not remain," "fleeting, superficial roles", "feeble identity in the hysterical," a "structureless structure" (p. 78-79), and, not least, a "formal structure : appearing instead of being" (p. 75). Also according to Kraus (1987), this structural trait affords the hysterical personality enormous flexibility for role-playing and rapid changes in behaviors, feelings, and states of mind (p. 80), but this personality, however, cannot be said to have a fragmented identity, as is the case with the borderline structure (Fuchs, 2007). Instead, it retains its capacity for historicization throughout life.
The definitions above address central traits of what we call hysteria: hysterica l consciousness is one of exaggeration, theatricality, and staging (Charbonneau, 2007). The theater is precisely, as we will see below, where human drama is overemphasized by way of caricatural expressiveness. Similarly, in the lived world, the hysterical existentia l manifestation entails mobilization of anything capable of dislodging the hysterical self from its situation of inferiority and hyposufficiency, granting it, even if falsely, a position of centrality. What is at stake here is that hysteria is based on an experience of imbala nce between poles of interpersonality. There is an anthropological disproportion (Blankenburg, 1982) between the ontological importance of two poles: self and other, with priority assigned to otherness (Messas, Zorzanelli, & Tamelini, 2019). The exaggerated expressiveness, or typical dramaticity (Charbonneau, 2007), of hystericals is based on this fragility of the self, disproportionately exposed to the existential supremacy of the other. An attempt to redress the balance of this situation is required of hysterica l individuals, who do so by striving to remove the other from indifference and attract him or her. The cruciality of this interpersonal trait led to Schneider's refusal, in his classic study Klinische Psychopathologie [Clinical Psychopathology], to use the term hysteria for one of the psychopathies he addressed, preferring instead the more explicit, descriptive notion of "psychopaths in need of esteem" (Schneider, 2007).
This anthropological disproportion toward otherness leads the hysterica l personality to eagerly participate in the game of roles played in human society, while it hinders the capacity of this structure to leave its position of inferiority, thus constraining its maturation. Nonetheless, there is positive value in this mode-of-being-and Dörr (Dörr Zegers, 2008;Stanghellini & Fuchs, 2013) remarks that the hysterical mode-of-being is not tied to fixed roles. It does not fall prey to the imprisonment of values of the melancholic, nor does it live-inward like the obsessive, but, on the contrary, it allows instinct to be liberated, admired by the world and others. Hystericals thus might live spontaneously and, in doing so, be much loved by their companions. For Dörr, hysterica ls "are just an enhanced version of this role playing that is life" (p. 21). We are here addressing an anthropological proportion (Blankenburg, 1982) that, when extremely disproportionate, exhibits its hysterical form to the clinician not as a pathology, but an existential problem: a matter of non-recognition of self, an unceasing need of movement, change, and being in evidence, a sense of incompleteness that can, for instance, manifes t symptomatically as anxiety.

Spatiality
Investigating spatiality seems to us the best approach to understanding the existential possibility imbued in the phenomenon of hysteria-hence the relevance of revisiting the works of classic phenomenologists who examined this phenomenon.
The spatiality we are addressing appears in Minkowski (Blankenburg, 1982) as lived space: "we live and act in space, and in space our personal life develops, in the same manner as the collective life of humankind" (p. 368). This, however, is not merely geometrical space: "we have before us the issue of lived space, irrational space or, if I may say so, the amathematical, ageometrical space" (p. 369).
Another classic contribution toward understanding spatiality is the distinctio n made by Binswanger between horizontality and verticality (Binswanger, 1977), the former being "the 'attraction for wideness', in the horizontal sense, corresponding more closely to 'discursiveness', to experiencing, crossing, and taking possession of the outer and inner 'world'" (p. 17). From this definition, horizontality can be understood as a "spatial mesh" in the horizontal sense, within which all information about the world reaches us and in which we live out all our experiences. Binswanger (1977) defines verticality as the attraction for height, for rising in the vertical sense, corresponding more to an aspiration to overcoming 'earth's gravity,' to rising above pressure and the 'anguish of earthly things,' but at the same time the aspiration to conquer a 'higher ' point of view, a 'higher view of things' [...]  Verticality is therefore a sense present in all of us (Binswanger, 2002), through which we derive the capacity to appropriate all experimentation, thus making ourselves absolutely unique in this experiential field that is the world. Two other aspects addressed by Minkowski concern light and dark space. Of light space, he says (Minkowski, 1973): I also situate myself in this space, and in doing so make myself similar, at least in one aspect of my being, to ambient things; I occupy a place in this space, relative to other objects which are there [...]. Space thus becomes a 'public domain' […]; I share it with everything that is there; I no longer own all that it contains outside of me; I occupy only a very small place in it. It is in this space that I see my fellow men -seeing, moving, acting, living as I do. Light space is a preferably socialized space, in the broadest sense of the word. (p. 394) In contrast to light space, dark space is thus outlined by Minkowski (1973): "the dark night also has something more personal in relation to the self; I am face to face with it; it is more 'mine' than light space is" (p. 374). Being secret, "this space will not be socialized. It will be mine, without being subjective in the common sense of the word, since an objective character is attributed to what happens in it" (p. 396). Light and dark space are not mutually exclusive dimensions of spatiality. We exist in both and should merely observe how much we live in each of them, which would depend on the relationship of these spaces with the existential structure in each of us (Minkowski, 1973).
Minkowski adds that "our life develops in space and, by this fact, remains one; space therefore contributes to make us a collectivity, but among us there is always free space, the lived distance, loaded with individual possibilities, allowing each one who lives in this space to lead their own lives" (p. 375). The phenomena of spatiality described above are not identical. Binswange r employs a descriptive metaphor drawing on the analysis of a case of mania revealing "directions of sense" of consciousness. Minkowski, in turn, describes static spatial perceptions of consciousness. These spatial concepts appear intersected when we observe that horizontality and light space are both situated in the collective sphere, on the "outside" of the being, while verticality and dark space are solely associated with the inner being. For Dörr, Binswanger claims his concept of 'anthropological proportions' to be a norm from which the concrete human being can deviate, constituting an ontological foundation that determines both pathological behavior and any typologies [...]. A typical existential proportion is given [...] by verticality and horizontality. In the schizoid, for instance, [...] there would be disproportion toward verticality, while in the typus melancholicus [...] the disproportion would favor horizontality. (Dörr Zegers, 2008) Although metaphorical, Binswanger's statements reflect his concept of 'anthropological proportions'. We not only agree with these assertions; we have concluded that the hysterical structure is more proportionate toward horizontality.
Similarly, we derive from Minkowski's studies, although these address spatial perceptions, that the hysterical and the melancholic perceive, or are more open to, the light space of consciousness, as is evident in Binswanger's definition of space. It is precisely at this point, therefore, that the two definitions, although distinct, resemble each other and make our reading possible.
Finally, let us touch on two other key concepts for understanding the spatiality of hysteria: syntony and schizoidism. By Minkowski's definition (Minkowski, 1973), "syntony refers to the principle that allows us to vibrate in unison with the environme nt, while schizoidism, by contrast, means the potentiality of moving away from that same environment. [...] We mean they behave as opposite forces, referring to two different sides of our being, both equally essences" (p. 71). These concepts are connected with the others addressed above and can be arranged into two fields: syntony, horizontality, and light space; schizoidism, verticality, and dark space. Minkowski outlines this conceptual interrelationship by defining "vital contact with reality" (Minkowski, 2004) as this mobile wave that surrounds us from all sides and constitute s the environment we could not live without. From it, like islands, emerge 'events,' shaking the most intimate fibers of our personality, penetrating it [...]. This is how this wondrous harmony between us and reality is established, harmony that allows us to follow the march of the world, always safeguard ing the notion of our own life. (p. 134) From the spatial point of view, therefore, horizontality and harmony would be connected, constituting qualities that would act on the same spatial plane. The same would apply to schizoidism and dark space (Minkowski, 1973). Commenting on autism as per Bleuler, Minkowski states: "Bleuler introduced such an important notion of autism to characterize the mode of being of schizophrenics, defining it as 'disconnection from reality, accompanied by relative or absolute predominance of inner life" (p. 72).

Spatial traits of hysteria
The conceptual operatives presented above not only render the description of hysteria spatiality richer; they also make the essence of this phenomenon more intelligible.

Increased syntony
Syntony manifests through gaze. In our relationships, the gaze typically captures our attention: gaze is the prime conduit through which we identify with the other and perceive his or her lived experience. Make eye contact with a hysterical structure and we are bound to be arrested for a while by something vivid, luminous, attentive in it. We are immediately sucked into that glance. This exchange of glances is accompanied by some sort of vertigo: a glance transports us to their very experience; it conveys their liveline ss, presence, and syntony. The hysterical eye provides a patent aperture to the outside, to the point of enabling us to perceive what lies within. In the gaze we can also perceive a nonpresence-we need just compare the gaze of a hysterical with that of existential structures that have little in common with the hysterical type. In severe forms of autism or schizophrenia, as well as during psychotic episodes, decreased syntony becomes perceptible; by not attuning with the outside, the inner world obscures any reading on the part of the observer and makes the sharing of experiences unfeasible.
Beyond the exchange of glances, the very sense of vision must be considered. Minkowski (1973) underscores the salience of vision, directly relating it to light space. Messas (2010) reinforces how vision influences the experience of hystericals (p. 18). We add to these considerations the relationship between vision and hysteria, from the sociological point of view. Today, the so-called "artistic"-as in the television and cinematographic industry, for instance-has acquired ubiquitous prominence. A myriad of channels in every type of medium generate and disseminate news bulletins, gossip, and plenty of intrigue about this "artistic" realm. Hysteria is notorious in these media. Let us think of any print magazine edited for this readership: most likely, it comes in slightly larger format than more conventional publications; the cover typically bears a striking photograph framed by brief, eye-catching headlines, followed by pages dense in images but very little text. These images seldom portray, with any reliability, the actual experience lived by those portrayed. On the contrary, it is easy to spot photographs doctored to create a life fantasy, fostering in the reader a desire to be what one is not.
Such high importance assigned to appearance is prominent in hysterical structures, given their increased proportion toward horizontal, collective space.

Increased horizontal and collective proportion
Encountering individuals exhibiting showy behavior often leads us to intuitive ly categorizing them as hysterical. This occurs, for instance, when they demonstrate their effusiveness too emphatically. Although intuitive and unspecific, this type of judgment can prove fitting to some measure, in as far as effusiveness may harbor a hysterica l component. Because hysteria is situated in the horizontality of collective space, it manifests in this spatial dimension. Effusiveness shows, to everyone within reach, something being experienced in the personal realm, but this experience is not truly personal: even as it is lived, it is promptly, almost automatically, exteriorized. Because this process takes place in the collective space and the existential structure finds it hard to leave the stage, the personal feeling does not contain itself and overflows beyond the borders of self, flooding the surrounding space. From an intense experience marked by a wide aperture to the outer world and a narrow aperture to the inner realm, in addition to abundant exchanges with the world, feelings quickly overflow and find in the world plenty of surface on which to spread. We are thus faced with the hysterical exclamatio n, which is often given away by its interjections.
We also call hystericals those who dress and adorn themselves in a striking, eyecatching manner. Again, our view of the phenomenon can explain this frequent judgment : hysterical individuals navigate in the collective space-hence a fondness of personal appearance, fashion, and aesthetic resources is all the more expected: getting attention is their ultimate goal. Like no other, hystericals know how to move around, occupy space, and be noticed and regarded as attractive. Such eagerness for attention, however, can give rise to its opposite: repulsion. On crossing paths with a hysterical individual while walking down the street makes us surprised not just at the sight, but also at an inebriating fragrance that takes hold of our nostrils and sparks our imagination. Nonetheless, if physical proximity is prolonged-such as during a lengthy conversation-the olfactory rapture can turn into nausea.

Ease of movement in terms of horizontality
Regarding the ease with which hysterical individuals move around in the horizontal dimension, Dörr (Dörr Zegers, 2008) remarked: hystericals turn to the world and to others. They neither feel their inner bodies nor are tormented by instincts, [...] life proceeds in the form of being noticed or admired, allowing themselves to be seen, for that matter, on the surface; they live in spontaneity, break all orders, deal in their own manner with interpersona l relationships-and how loved by their companions they are! Never have I seen love more unconditional than in couples with hysterical personalities. Would this be just some sort of masochism? Or would it be the case that the hysterical individ ua l knows how to 'entertain' [from Latin inter + tenere, 'hold between']-i.e., holding both self and other in betweenness-lik e no one else. (p. 21) This existential structure is objective: it acts without ever flinching and constantly seeks pleasure. Knowing how to "entertain," it can very well achieve sexual satisfactio n for itself and its partner. Furthermore, because this structure is invasive, it is no surprise that, in the clinical setting, hysterical patients behave as long-time friends of ours.
Hysteria is easily noticed-it catches our eye. Movement, gesture, voice, scent, clothing-in a word, presence-denounce it in the plainest of environments, even when not consciously exhibited. Attempts to compare it with, for instance, obsessive existentia l structures make it more evident how exuberant hysteria is. When sharing an environme nt with us, obsessive individuals will not make themselves noticed-on the contrary, they will withdraw and remain quietly observing. The subject's isolation is noteworthy in this case, given the difficulty of the obsessive structure to "entertain" (Dörr Zegers, 2008, p. 21). What is in excess on one end lacks therefore on the other. This comparison between the hysterical and a structure characterized by little horizontality and much verticalitysuch as the "extravagant" in Binswanger (1977)-finds support in the following passage: [...] what we mean with the term "extravagant" is conditioned by the fact that the being-there has "got stuck" in a given "experience" [...] owing to the fact that it can no longer "pack the tent" [...] the being-there can no longer expand, review, or examine its "horizon of experiences" and stands still at a "shortsighted"-i.e., narrowly limited-point of view. The being-there has thus "stopped short" [...]. Moreover, a similar absolutizatio n is only possible after the being-there has isolated itself from dealing and trading with others [...]. (p. 15) Therefore, when not restricted to hysteria-i.e., not vulnerable in their relationship with the world from the existential point of view (Fuchs, 2013)-hystericals enjoy a number of advantages in the collective space: theirs is an existential structure much appreciated by other people-they are joyful, relaxed, and interactive, with rapid changes in their state of mind. Hystericals are typically well at ease at parties, for instance, in the same way as they easily adapt to new situations, such as when becoming parents, siblings, or partners.

Perceptual distortion in terms of horizontality
Given their spatial experience shaped in horizontality, collectiveness, and syntony, it not surprising that a spatial distortion in these aspects subsists in hysterica l individuals.
This distortion can be identified in the suggestible character of this type of personality. Let us consider the case of someone who occasionally self-medicates for headaches and, having just ingested the medication, realizes the drug is past its expiry date. Taken by sudden discomfort, they imagine that death will soon befall. Their respiratory rate quickly increases and they are taken to the emergency room feeling rigidity in the upper limbs. Since the individual has never experienced an episode of discomfort caused by expired medication, the idea that the expired drug is doing harm is "external" to the subject: it is part of their knowledge of the world, not of personal experience. Because the hysterical structure preferably relates to the world in the collective space, and hence has difficulty withdrawing from this sphere, the hysterica l individual only fleetingly considers the possibility that the expired medication may pose no harm-rather, they are soon taken by an idea external to themselves and exhibit this idea without interiorizing it to any degree.
Viewed in spatial terms, the symptomatology of conversive disorder-unders tood as a manifestation of hysterical nature-becomes more intelligible. Faced with the spatial impossibility of retreating from the world, allowing conflicts to coexist, the symptom emerges as the handiest resource available for this mode of existence. The symptom is a materialized exit from this non-conformity.

The essence of hysteria
Taken separately, the concepts of horizontality, light space, and syntony prove insufficient to characterize hysteria in spatial terms. The typus melancholicus, for instance, is a structure recognizable in rigid social roles (Ambrosini, Stanghellini, & Langer, 2011), thus preferably experiencing the light space of consciousness. A specific, unique feature of action in the lived space adds to the phenomenon of hysteria : dramaticity-the very essence of hysteria. In its Greek origin (Moisés, 2002), the word δράμα (drama) refers to action, and therefore to movement (p. 132). As outlined earlier, hysterical individuals act by way of the worldliness they experience, which characterizes them as intensely present in the world and with the world, in relational terms. This means that a hysterical is someone proportionally well attuned with the world. In Aristotle (Moisés, 2002;Suñol, 2009), the concept of drama acquires theatrical meaning, thereby involving roles, stage, and audience, as concerns the collective space of representatio n.
In this space, attention of the audience is oriented toward the scene unfolding on stage, toward the acting by actors. For Aristotle, theatrical drama involves imitation, by which people directly act and operate on stage (Suñol, 2009, p. 1-12).
This imitation, as Suñol remarks, points to the etymological sources of the concept of image: "It is noteworthy that the Latin term imitatio shares the same root with imago, which mainly refers to an image or visual similarity" (Suñol, 2009, p. 1). A relations hip exists among vision, harmony, and horizontality that we cannot ignore. Mimick ing requires attunement. Representing any given role-and thus expressing a behavior that allows members of a society to communicate and identify-requires those who represent to have the capacity to grasp a shared meaning of the world. Dramatization therefore comprises the ideas of imitation and syntony. While imitating, one is not necessarily original, since the very idea of imitation harbors the notion of copying. As Kraus (1987) notes, "hystericals are always 'playing roles' and end up not knowing who they are" (p. 75-76). When we play roles foreign to ourselves, we perform, deep down, a copy of what we observe: one of the elements present in the Greek concept of person as mask is the dialectic operating between the being per se and the being as if, between the identity of self and the identity of the role [...], between factuality and transcendence. The actor is simultaneously himself and the represented character. And in Greek theater this duality was signaled by the mask. The more the actor transforms himself into the represented character, the less he will be himself; conversely, when his self is strongly manifes t, the profile of the represented character will be lost. (Kraus, 1987) The investigations of Kraus and Dörr on the playing of social roles address, in our view, the interpersonality of consciousness. At this point, however, spatiality converges with interpersonality and can be better observed: In the obsessive personality, for instance, the distance between self and role is very short-nearly as short as in depressive personalities-which would explain its lack of elasticity in every sense, while in hysterical personalities the distance between one type of identity and the other is quite long. This would explain the lack of "loyalty" to roles that can be observed in hysterica l individuals: how easily they change spouses, jobs, ideologie s, tastes, habits, etc. (Dörr Zegers, 2008) Nonetheless, our view differs from Dörr's. In hystericals, it is not only the distance between one's own identity and roles that reveals how these structures interact socially, but it is one's own identity that proves unable to endure-contrary to the obsessive and the melancholic, in whom the personality is very rigid (Ambrosini, 2011;Dörr Zegers, 2008). In a word, personalities attach or detach from social roles because this is their mode of being-in-the-world.
Finally, in addition to imitation, a key feature of hysteria, which manifests in spatiality, is colorfulness: because hystericals are strongly connected to the world, they have more intense perceptions and, at the same time, faster responses. Dramaticity now emerges no longer in the Greek sense of the term, but in that which is conveyed in the Portuguese language as touching, moving, admirable, impressive, and at the same time ridiculous, tragic, pathetic, difficult. Charbonneau, for instance, although guided by a different perspective, shares this understanding by claiming that the existential situatio n of hystericals is marked by emotional intensity and centrality in interpersona l relationships (Charbonneau, 2007, p. 23-30).

Final considerations
Having introduced the concepts of essence and structure, and drawing on phenomenological sources, we reviewed how the hysterical structure manifests in terms of interpersonality. This enabled us to observe, based on the definitions of light and dark space, syntony and schizoidism (as per Minkowski), and horizontality and verticality (as per Binswanger), how the hysterical personality experiences the collective space and attunes to the world more intensely than other structures.
After analyzing the core human characteristics of spatiality, we derive that the essence of hysteria constitutes a key potentiality for our existence as social beings. As potentiality-i.e., as an anthropological modality-the phenomenon we call hysteria has four characteristics: increased syntony, increased horizontal and collective proportion, ease of movement in horizontality, and perceptive distortion in the horizontal dimens io n. This is, therefore, an experience grounded in the social field, and thus of increased "exteriority," relative to the individual. Hysterical individuals are attuned to the world in which they live their experience. On the one hand, these features (if not extreme) facilita te existence in the social field, but on the other make the personality more suggestible. And, finally, the experience of hysteria is dramatic in itself.
Other fundamental phenomenological categories can be addressed in relation to hysteria, including temporality, corporeality, and intersubjectivity [Messas e melissa ].
The intersubjective phenomenon has been markedly present in the descriptions of the hysterical personality by classic authors, but it has not been our intention to describe such phenomena. In short, we may conclude that a drastic reduction in approximation with the world, in terms of syntony and horizontality-and hysteria is endowed with both as potentiality-ultimately detaches humans from their imbrication in the world. An example can be found in autism, where an almost absolute absence of horizontality and syntony compromises existence. This radical condition reveals the need for the presence of some hysterical essence in human interactions with each other and with the world. Nietzsche. Genealogia da moral: uma polêmica.