

Inner-time consciousness and its gradual modification in the stages of the early schizophrenia, according to Klaus Conrad.

A consciência interna do tempo e sua modificação gradual nos estágios da esquizofrenia inicial, segundo Klaus Conrad.

Guilherme Ludovice Funaro

Abstract

The following study aims to retrieve the evolution of the early schizophrenia, as described by Conrad, and to outline a temporal hermeneutics inspired by Husserl, with the purpose of understanding the distinct phenomena in question from this perspective. To this end, I provide a brief overview of Conrad's work, his diagnosis of the crisis in the sciences, and his Gestalt analysis method. I also situate the development of temporality as proposed by Husserl in his "Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins" (1985) and some central concepts, such as affection. Next, I attempt to construct a reading that traverses the different stages of the early schizophrenia, under the thesis of the centrality of a functional/structural alteration of temporality for understanding the phenomena outlined by patients, and the suggestion that there is a pattern of alteration operating from protension to retention and from transcendence of immanence to immanence.

Keywords: Temporality; Husserl; Intersubjectivity; Klaus Conrad; Schizophrenia; Trema; Apophany; Delusion.

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Resumo

O seguinte estudo tem por objetivo resgatar a evolução do surto esquizofrênico, como descrito por Conrad e traçar uma hermenêutica temporal, de inspiração husserliana, com a finalidade de apreender os distintos fenômenos em questão sob tal ótica. Para tal traço uma breve situação da obra de Conrad, seu diagnóstico de crise das ciências e seu método de análise gestáltica. Situo também o desenvolvimento da temporalidade, como proposto por Husserl em seu *“Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins”* (1985) e alguns conceitos centrais, como o de afecção. Em seguida tento traçar uma leitura que passa pelas distintas fases do surto inicial esquizofrênico, sob a tese da centralidade de uma alteração funcional/ estrutural da temporalidade para compreensão dos fenômenos esboçados pelos pacientes e a sugestão de que há um padrão de alteração que opera da protensão à retenção e da transcendência da imanência em direção à imanência.

Palavras-chave: Temporalidade; Husserl; Intersubjetividade; Klaus Conrad; Esquizofrenia; Trema; Apofania; Delírio.

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Introduction

There is a great interest in the psychopathological study of schizophrenia, focusing on alterations that could predict its progression (Chapman 1987), long before the expression of an acute psychotic episode. The most recent consequence of this is an approach that not only considers the symptoms of an acute episode, such as delusions and hallucinations, but also insidious modifications of self-consciousness, involving alterations in ipseity, disturbances of common sense, hyper-reflexivity, etc. (Parnas 2005; Raballo 2011).

Symptoms do not appear randomly but follow an order of manifestation, as suggested by Conrad (1997). Other authors have studied this topic, such as Klosterkötter (1992), who investigated the basic symptoms in the genesis of schizophrenia, based on the Bonn Transition Sequences study, which explored the chronological evolution of Schneider's first-rank symptoms. Fuchs (2015) contributed to this transitional perspective by demonstrating the evolution of self-disorders, moving from pre-reflexive intentionality towards ego disorders, a reflective and more complex modality.

Moreover, analyzing the temporal structure of intentionality is not a new approach in understanding schizophrenia. Fuchs (2007, 2013, 2017) postulated that a failure within the binding of successive moments, from a husserlian perspective, would lead to a "loss" and "fragmentation" of the structure of the inner time-consciousness, which is fundamental to intentionality and it is central to understanding the loss of common sense of reality, compensated by a hyper-reflexive construction. Stanghellini (2016) highlights abnormal temporal experiences in schizophrenic patients, particularly those in acute crisis, compared to chronically affected individuals, predominantly showing "fragmentation of time experience," characterized by a compromise in the pre-reflective synthesis of the temporal arc of retention, primal impression, and protention.

This study aims to address a point that has not yet been explored in the literature: applying Husserl's perspective on temporality and consciousness, as explored in his "Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins" (1985), to a detailed assessment of the phases described by Conrad (1997). The latter, at a certain point in his work, discusses temporal alterations during schizophrenic episodes, although, as will become clearer, he deliberates on a non-phenomenological temporality. The present study assumes a different perspective: not only is the temporality dissected here

phenomenological in essence, but it also argues that temporal alterations are not only present from the prodromal complaints (such as *Trema*) but take central importance in understanding patients' reported experiences. The goal of correlating these authors is to construct a temporal hermeneutics—a temporal fingerprint impressed by what is conventionally called an acute schizophrenic episode—allowing for the construction of a staging logic in temporal terms.

Furthermore, in pursuit of a reliable temporal characterization, the concept developed here will share certain perspectives regarding the non-emotional affective aspect and its role in the centrality of temporal structure (Sul 2022). Adopting the notion of affectivity, as developed in Husserl, will be highly significant, as the suggested notions above—such as “*fragmentation*” and “*loss*” of the concatenation of temporal structures—lead to an intentional form that is impossible to experience and communicate, given that all intentional forms are temporal. From this new perspective, there would not be a structural temporal alteration but rather a functional anomaly, preserving intentional forms.

The structure of this study will follow these presentations: first, an analysis of Klaus Conrad, his importance in an epistemic crisis context, his research on schizophrenic patients and his innovative method. Then, a brief overview of certain notions of temporality in Husserl, especially those developed in his “*Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*” (1985). Subsequently, an analysis of the phases of acute schizophrenic episodes and how these complaints can be interpreted through Husserlian philosophical premises. The conclusion will recap the main developed notions, summarizing a certain style of functional temporal disruption, following a pattern that allows for staging acute episodes in temporal terms.

Klaus Conrad and Gestalt Analysis

It is appropriate to begin this article with a few brief words about the author: Klaus Conrad (1905–1961) (Conrad 1997, p. 9) taught psychiatry and neurology, holding the position of director at the University Clinic for Nervous System Diseases in Göttingen. He was a disciple of Kretschmer and was heavily influenced by Jaspers and the Heidelberg school.

His study, which serves as the foundation for the present paper, was conducted with patients experiencing recent schizophrenic episodes. Having facilitated access to the German army, he was able to study highly homogeneous groups, such as soldiers of military

age, who received very similar therapeutic methods and were under environmental pressure. There were 107 soldiers, mostly between 20 and 31 years old. These similarities allowed for an inquiry into the invariants of the disease—what appeared as normative within the anomaly—through an analysis of form and its configurations.

The method of analysis, termed *Gestalt*, emerged in the context of scientific crisis. According to a paradigm model (Widlocher 2006), to understand the state of psychiatry, the transition from the 19th to the 20th century heralded the decline of the positivist model, which had been dominant, and the rise of psychoanalysis and phenomenology. In this debate, Jaspers and his “General Psychopathology” (Jaspers 1913) stand out, as he had a significant influence on Conrad. For the latter, both the explanatory model of natural sciences and the comprehensive model drained psychopathology and were inadequate for assessing the initial schizophrenic episode—either reducing it to physiology or losing itself in hermeneutic speculations. The alternative was an investigation that grasped the modifications of intentional forms in schizophrenic consciousness in a procedural manner—not under the sign of negativity, as a loss of function, but as a structural reorganization inseparable from the relational character of a schizophrenic world—avoiding prior psychological constructions and theories, applying itself only to what presents itself to consciousness and can be described and distinguished. Ultimately, *Gestalt* analysis would capture the fundamental structures of the processuality of the initial schizophrenic episode (Ploog 2002).

From the described method and its understanding of form (*Gestalt*) as a relational totality, configured in a peculiar manner, one can infer a phenomenological inspiration. However, Husserl, a central figure in phenomenology—whose exposition will be addressed in the next section—is mentioned only once at the beginning of Conrad’s work, in the context of crisis, highlighting how his role was fundamental in reestablishing man as a subject and not merely an object of natural sciences.

Consciousness and Temporality

Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), mathematician and philosopher, was the founder of the phenomenological movement. He was a critic of modern sciences, particularly regarding their degeneration into a non-philosophical study of facts, exemplified by positive sciences and their “naturalism,” understood as the tendency to explore the physical and psychic world through natural sciences. His radicalism should not be read as a destructive

impulse but, etymologically, as a return to the root of all forms of knowledge, which initially consisted of a “turn to the object” (*Wende zum Gegenstand*) and later in the exploration of the consciousness of the knowing subject, attempting to construct a philosophy “free of presuppositions” (*voraussetzungslos*) (Spiegelberg 1994).

To introduce the model of consciousness that will be explored, it is first necessary to examine how Husserl understands temporality, based on his work “*Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*” (1985). It represents a transition in husserlian thought, from an eidetic psychology—proposing an exploration of the foundations of knowledge, establishing its eidetic conditions that make a given phenomenon one of consciousness rather than nature—to a transcendental phenomenology. Husserl gave lectures during the winter semester of 1904/1905 which are of seminal importance for his conclusions regarding time-consciousness and their foundational role in pure phenomenology. The fourth part of these lectures, titled “On the Phenomenology of Time”, was not published in its original form but rather in *husserliana* X, already revised by Edith Stein. It is important to note that his analyses were not concluded in this fourth part of his presentation during those winter semesters, as they would later find further development in manuscripts C and L—referred to as research manuscripts, which directly translate the author's thought processes (Kortooms 2002).

Time, in essence, is the structure that converts consciousness into a unity of acts and experiences (*Erlebnisse*). This internal consciousness of time amalgamates the tripartite temporal structure, ensured by a passive synthesis of consciousness, without the participation of the ego (Oliveira 2024).

Husserl refers to the tripartite structure of temporal consciousness through the notion of the temporal halo (*Zeithof*). In contrast to the idea of a punctiform present, he presents a consciousness articulated intentionally not only to a primal impression (*Urimpression*) but also to an immediate past, termed retention, and an immediate future, known as protention. Thanks to this structure, explored in paragraph X (Husserl 1985), the identity of a temporal object, such as a melody, is maintained and can be experienced not as a truncated series of disjointed notes but as a harmonic whole, a succession of notes.

The consciousness of the duration of a temporal object occurs because there is duration in consciousness—not only do transcendent objects possess extension, but the constitutive acts of time are also temporal. There is a theoretical aspect here regarding the content-apprehension model (Thomé 2013) used by Husserl in the first part of his book,

which encounters its limit in the problem of infinite regression when questioning the origin of time. Husserl's solution lies in the idea of absolute consciousness or absolute flow, from which temporality emanates, though devoid of time. The very notion of flow here is metaphorical, as it refers to a layer devoid of temporality.

This conceptual shift modifies the constitutive phases of time: whereas previously there was a continuum of apprehension acts, now primal impression, retention, and protention are not acts but modes of consciousness of these more fundamental levels of temporal constitution. That is, the flow of consciousness constitutes itself from its own present consciousness, operating protention and retention within its own temporal bases, without the need for a meta-consciousness (which would otherwise fail to resolve the problem of infinite regression). This establishes a pre-reflective contiguity regarding the temporal unity of consciousness, in which this succession is apprehended as consciousness itself—or, in other words, I experience “my” conscious experience as a unified temporality. Hence the inseparability of the term *Zeitbewusstsein* rather than something like *zeitliches Bewusstsein*. In sum, the experience of temporality, as phenomenologically constituted, underpins a pre-reflective form of self-consciousness.

I highlight this discussion to suggest that, at its most fundamental level, time-consciousness is something other than time. There is a dialectical processual dynamic in consciousness that incorporates the structure of alterity as its own. There is an *ipsis-alter* tension that finds a sublation in the manner of consciousness. This tension permeates the entire unfolding of the temporal structure, such as in the tension between retention (*ipsis*)—as maintenance, an “still”—versus protention (*alter*)—as openness, a future. Observing the microscopic transitions between a now, an immediately before, and an immediately after, at what point does a temporal modality cease to be itself and become another? Can we speak of a transition point? If there is unity in an act of consciousness, in a temporal object, then it both is and is not, simultaneously. We reach a point where the everyday grammar fails to access. Paul Ricoeur (Ricoeur 1997, p. 49) defines it as follows: *“That something persists while changing is what it means to endure. The identity that results from this is no longer a logical identity but precisely a temporal totality.”*

Also relevant to this discussion is the concept of affection (*Affektion*) (Sul 2022), which designates the a priori correlation between consciousness (*ipsis*) and what is not consciousness (*alter*), also characterizing the attraction exerted by the world on consciousness. In the context of temporality, affection will designate the attraction exerted

by temporal modalities, with the present exerting the greatest intensity—through the primal impression. This primal impression undergoes a modal transformation as it flows into the past, diminishing affection. This modification marks the past as past, through the gradual transition between primal impression and retention. Similarly, retention diminishes the affective intensity of protention, ensuring that the new present is not experienced as a surprise. In summary, this is a crucial element in organizing the temporal flow.

I won't delve deeply into Husserl's considerations on reflection (Renaudie 2022), but only highlight one detail, particularly from his 1905 lectures, which had a strong influence on the "*Vorlesungen*" discussed here. There is an irreducible distance between the lived present and the lived experience, apprehended through its objectification via reflection—thanks to the temporal structure of consciousness. The consequence of this is that, for example, in the sentence: "I reflect on the fact that I see a bird," these multiple "I's", here represented as subject and object, are not experienced as distinct, either psychologically or phenomenologically. Thus, consciousness is an "I" that is also a "non-I", like a "You", which simultaneously is a "We", like an "I-You", which ultimately is "I" (this relates to the concept of a "social self" (de Haan 2010)). The aspect of an intra-subjective intersubjectivity, as suggested here, will be revisited in greater detail in the next section of this work and will serve as a bridge for considering temporality as the foundation of intersubjectivity.

Inner Time-Consciousness and Intersubjectivity

Above was suggested that the dialectical processuality that constitutes time-consciousness involves a dynamic incorporation of alterity within itself. Empirically, this is not new, and language is a good example of a living apparatus, collectively constructed, that precedes the individual—yet the individual uses it to explore their own experiences. The aim here is to establish the conditions of possibility for this phenomenon through an argument that builds a bridge to overcome the solipsistic risk of an internal time-consciousness, fostering intersubjective synchronism. There are many possible approaches to avoid this risk, but only one will be reproduced here, with a few words reserved at the end for the notion of *Weltzeit* (world-time).

The idea that perception operates passively, allowing the external, predetermined real to imprint its mark on some cognitive instance—whose function would be merely representative—does not hold within an enactivist perspective. Thompson (2007) clarifies

some principles of this model, emphasizing cognition as an exercise of situated knowledge within an acting body, conceiving cognitive structure as emerging from sensorimotor patterns modulated by endogenous factors, which in turn act upon this sensorimotor coupling—thus establishing a relational perspective between cognition and the world.

A point of convergence between the enactivist perspective and phenomenology is that both conceive the mind as constituting its objects—not as a form of creation, but rather as unveiling the world through the intentional activity of consciousness. Intentionality, understood as mental acts such as perceiving, remembering, and judging, cannot be grasped separately from its intentional object, and vice versa—they exhibit directionality.

The theme “intentionality” is complex and of central importance, not only to husserlian phenomenology. It is worth noting that intentional acts are grounded in the temporal structure of consciousness. For instance, when saying “I see the bird,” upon pronouncing “see,” I do not need to reflexively return to confirm that I am the one seeing—just as the verb requires a complement, pointing towards the object.

Objectivity is conceived as a construction based on different perspectives, such as when one touches an object, moves around it, using the body as a zero-point reference (Fuchs 2020). Husserl (Moran 2012) highlights that any given perception of an object is always perspectival, though there is an apperception of the shaded facets of the object, allowing them to be updated within a horizon of meanings. After all, one does not merely see facets but rather a sofa, a pen, a book... This same dynamic of horizons enables an individual not to doubt the existence of something even when it is absent (for example, beyond the room where I am, there exists a stable world that persists, where objects present themselves independently of my perception).

Horizon is another key term: in the example of perception, it means that the adumbrated aspects point beyond themselves, but also that perception itself could occur from other angles, other perspectives. Since consciousness is an opening to what lies beyond it, these non-present presentations—the hidden facets—may belong to other subjects besides myself, indicating an intersubjective structure. Apperception would then weave together intersubjective horizons and my temporalizing consciousness. This is not about factual alterity but rather an abstract structure of intersubjectivity as openness—a properly transcendental structure that underpins subjective and intersubjective experiences (Rodemeyer 2006). This concept of transcendental intersubjectivity will be important, for example, in establishing a more elementary level of empathy beyond its

reproductive function, as well as in grounding my knowledge of the physical world beyond my personal experience.

Finally, a few words on the notion of *Weltzeit* (world-time) (Rodemeyer 2006), precisely because it overlaps with the notion of transcendental intersubjectivity. If each individual constitutes a “now” for their consciousness, and if this occurs separately from an intersubjective existence, it would be difficult to conceive of a present that could be collectively shared.

The notion of internal time-consciousness contrasts with the notion of “objective time”—clock time. Both occupy completely distinct phenomenological domains, yet time is neither solely the former nor exclusively the latter. In reality, they complement each other, with the former grounding the latter. The difficulty seems to lie precisely at this point: temporalizing consciousnesses cannot be too different, otherwise, we would have multiple objective times, each incomprehensible to the others. How, then, can solipsism be overcome and an intersubjective bridge established between these notions?

Faced with this methodological difficulty, Husserl hypothesizes a third temporal structure that synthesizes and synchronizes all individual presents, constituting an “objective” present—what he calls “world-time”. The quotation marks around “objective” are justified because this is not chronological objective time, measured by the clock, though “world-time” undeniably underpins chronological time. Here lies a synthesizing consciousness connecting all subjects and grounding temporality—a consciousness that is neither solely “own” (*ipsis*) nor “other” (*alter*). In conclusion, intersubjectivity extends beyond the factual existence of a multiplicity—it is given as a condition of possibility, a transcendental structure that fosters this connection between subjects.

The early stages of the first schizophrenic episode according to Conrad and the directive hermeneutic axis

Conrad describes five stages: *trema*, *apophanic stage*, *apocalyptic stage*, *consolidation*, and *residual stage*, which will be presented sequentially. However, before that, a few words on the contemporary understanding of the anomalous experience of schizophrenia. Much has been discussed regarding the experience of temporal fragmentation and fragmentation of the self-experience (*Ich störungen*) (Fuchs 2017; Fuchs 2020; Stanghellini 2016). One point seems central: if the notion of internal time-consciousness is closely linked to the constitution of a minimal self, as Husserl suggests,

and if these theories indicate a collapse of this structure, there would certainly be an anomalous experience of time. Yet, such an experience would not be accessible to psychopathological interlocutors, since all forms of intentionality are temporal—what kind of experience would this be, and how could it be communicated (Sul 2022)?

The concept of affection (*Affektion*), as described earlier, will be central to understanding an alternative hermeneutic that does not involve the disruption of the internal structure of time (Sul 2022) and properly allows anomalous experiences to be formulated and communicated in temporal terms. The hypothesis to be defended in this present paper is that the only phase involving temporal structural fragmentation—and thus its impenetrable nature—is catatonia, in the apocalyptic stage. Another point defended here is the suggestion that the alteration caused by a functional change in temporality follows a pattern, in which the retention of protention is first affected, followed by the retention of primal impression and the retention of retention.

It is important to emphasize the didactic nature of these phases, which are sometimes incompatible with clinical practice. Thus, while there are central elements to be described in each of these phases, there is a proto-incident description of elements in a previous phase, which will be fully revealed in the subsequent phase.

Trema

This is the first of these stages, which can last from one to two years. The term originates from theatrical language, referring to stage fright—the anxiety that precedes stepping onto the stage—and can take on a polychromatic tone with various shades, ranging from anxiety, anguish to the ecstasy of revelation.

It involves a phenomenological topology of the situation, as it conveys the idea of a narrowed experiential field, where movement possibilities are largely constrained, leaving only the dichotomous choice of triumph or demise. However, both alternatives lead to a path of no return—akin to the idiomatic expression crossing the Rubicon. There is no precise situation that instills this atmosphere, as demonstrated by the myriad examples presented by Conrad, but structurally, it is marked by the sense that something is about to erupt, albeit with anomalous features—a premonition of catastrophe (Seywert 1999), which should be understood etymologically as *καταστροφή*, meaning a turning downward, a pervasive qualitative change that will establish a new sediment.

One example is case 50, Sergeant Major Hiltfried K., 24 years old, who was on a campaign in France. He was an exemplary soldier. His operation was marked by mixed emotions—alongside the positive tone of a successful advance, there was dissatisfaction with the conduct of his peers, who looted whatever they found. This was no minor issue for him, as he even contemplated suicide. Once in Paris, defying superior orders, he took some comrades on an excursion to “instill respect for the culture of our enemies” (Conrad 1997, free translation, p. 57). He was subsequently arrested, and his promotion was suspended.

This phase is characterized by what Conrad calls “senseless behaviors” or “short-circuit actions”, where two incompatible situational fields are on an imminent collision course. The barriers of this phenomenological topology narrow, and the “rules of the game”, like the tacit liturgy governing these situations, become strained. This transgression of military discipline is an expression of an emergency reaction—an attempt to overcome this barrier to reestablish the subject’s insertion into the situation, essentially aiming to restore a certain homeostasis.

This phase marks the prodrome of a global alteration in experiences, where an “abyss” (Conrad 1997, p. 60) gradually emerges, disrupting the conditions that forge a sense of belonging to a shared ground among peers: “He sadly notes that he has lost the possibility of ‘we,’ the feeling of belonging. In a terrible way, he is exiled in his own world” (Conrad 1997, p. 60).

It is also observed that a significant number of schizophrenic processes begin as endogenous dysthymia, highlighting feelings of “inhibition”, “indecisiveness”, “a paralyzing weakness of will”, and, above all, “guilt”—the inability to fade past experiences. This mixture of agitation and inhibition is exemplified in Case 108: “It is an obscurely felt anguish, an agitation or excitement that no one knows where it comes from, perhaps partly from the subconscious... but I can’t take it anymore. I would bang my head against the wall, do anything, and yet I feel inhibited” (Conrad 1997, p. 59).

Distrust predicates this emerging restructuring of the experiential field. This transition is metaphorically likened to walking through a dark forest, where things lose their natural and self-evident character. If all meaning apprehension is a relation between figure and background, the suggestion here is a background transmutation that will confer a distinct meaning to things. Referring back to previous discussions, the shaded horizons in a normal psyche imply the security of a totality, through the very disposition to assume eccentric positions of a hypothetical alterity. In the schizophrenic prodrome, the shaded

horizon “is no longer secure” (Conrad 1997, p. 65). The truly terrifying aspect is not what imposes itself as a figure but rather the background, the unspoken, the unseen. If the “we”—as a set of intersubjectively shared meanings—is lost, this alterity, which enables a decentralized structure, fades away, giving rise not only to an intentional inversion, where the individual becomes the center of a self-referential world, but also to an anonymous, hostile alterity in the form of an inhospitable world (Fuchs 2020).

This altered background is well summarized by Jaspers’ expression “delusional mood”, described as “a pervasive alteration” (Conrad 1997, p. 67). The word “*Stimmung*”, which can be translated as mood or atmosphere, captures this encompassing perspective with poorly defined boundaries, engulfing the individual and lacking a semantic framework for expression, as seen in the phrase: “Something is happening, but I don’t know what it is; tell me what is happening...” (Conrad 1997, p. 68).

What is at stake here, Conrad reaffirms, is a radical change in existence itself. Unlike someone who hypothetically wakes up in a dark world—signifying this abrupt qualitative shift—and realizes they are blind or that their visual field has changed yet can still adopt a critical stance toward their world, assuming a hypothetical altered perspective, in the delusional mood, the afflicted individual loses this disposition for critical reflection on their world. This is precisely because what is unfolding is the loss of the ability for “transposition” (Conrad 1997, p. 70)—the capacity to assume an eccentric stance—due to the impossibility of integrating alterity. From this, one can infer the rigid nature of delusion.

To understand what is happening on a phenomenological temporal basis, a perspective that Conrad doesn’t provide us with, it is necessary to refer to the notion of affection, as previously discussed (Sul 2022). Following the suggestion of a pattern in the disorganization of temporal structure, one of the most fundamental markers of this phase is anxiety—the sensation of imminence. This sensation can be interpreted as the failure to fade the retention of “protention”, which should diminish the intensity of anticipation, resulting in an exaggerated pull toward the future—the feeling that something is about to erupt. Bin Kimura had already referred to this as “*ante-festum*” (Kimura 1992). This leads to a phenomenon of “hypersalience”, where everything in the experiential field demands attention, creating the impression that the individual is the object of an external intentional directionality—losing autonomy in selecting the intentional object of focus, thus reinforcing the idea of an “inversion of the intentional vector”.

However, there is a paradoxical mixture, as alongside this anxiety, there is a sense

of immobility—manifested, for example, in the narrowing of the experiential field or in dysthymic states, where the past emerges through the inability to fade guilt. The central issue here is a functional alteration in the retention of ‘primal impression’, which should fade as it flows into the immediate past, accompanied by a decrease in affective intensity. The consequence is a consciousness of a “persistent present”, evoking sensations of paralysis, inhibition, and immobility (Sul 2022).

Through this functional disturbance in “affection”, temporal experience is not only affected, but with it the synchronization of temporalities within a shared experiential ground is disrupted. The sublation process that operates the integration of the *ipsis-alter* dialectic is compromised. Consequently, the notion of transcendental intersubjectivity is compromised, as the ability to assume an eccentric stance is lost. Where alterity fails to co-constitute a common ground, the “Other” emerges as a sign of disintegration threat.

Apophanic stage

The Greek term “*apophany*” refers to “making manifest” or “revelation”, in reference to delusion. Whereas the previous phase was dominated by a diaphanous and anomalous atmosphere of new meaning, here delusion emerges with its characteristic of primary certainty—immediate and imposing. Jaspers (Jaspers 1997) discusses the three external characteristics of the phenomenon: they are held with extraordinary conviction, with incomparable subjective certainty, impervious to other experiences, counterarguments, and of impossible content. However, he adds: “if one seeks to explore the source of incorrigibility, it will not be found in a singular phenomenon but rather in the human situation as a whole” (Jaspers 1997, p. 104).

Until now, in the “*trema*”, there was an atmosphere of anomie and great tension, sometimes expressed as “as if”: “It was *as if* something were about to happen, as if I had to expect punishment, though I did not know why” (Conrad 1997, p. 67). This “as if” is the expression of a remnant of the possibility of assuming an eccentric position and deliberating from an exogenous point of view—that is, there is still something of this intersubjectivity that allows one to adopt the perspective of an anonymous alterity. This tense state of “ontological uncertainty”, a product of a transcendental disturbance, is converted into the certainty of a world event—the delusion (Fuchs 2020).

The temporal perspective of “*trema*”, shaped by affection, has made it clear that it operates within a dual field of forces: a retentive force, which does not fade and

hypertrophies this immanent dimension, and a protentive force marked by hypersalience. Delusion is a hermeneutic process whose revelatory nature operates in two distinct fields precisely due to this tension of vectorial forces in opposing directions.

Apophany of the encountered

At this point, intentional modalities still retain the mark of the self, of what is “mine”, although within the intentional structure, the altered element is the transcendent object (properly the immanence of transcendence): “The alteration affects only things in the external world” (Conrad 1997, p. 80), preserving representations, thoughts, feelings, and memories.

The illustrative case is number 96, a 21-year-old corporal named Harald, who was trying to write a letter to his brother but accused his roommate of pretending to sleep and snoring just to disturb him. Nearby, he also heard a woman striking a key and making other noises with the same intent—undoubtedly directed at him. At one point, upon shouting “silence”, he felt that he could impose his will on others if he concentrated.

To delve into the peculiarity of this experience is to recognize that one could argue that such conviction is false for various reasons. However, the patient is permeated by a primary conviction. The fact is that perception is always relational—it is a “seeing as”, an apprehension of perspective. One might have the impression of being called and then realize it was a mistake. This transposition is what is impossible for the schizophrenic. Interestingly, the German language preserves this interplay between the words “*Verrückt*”, meaning madness, and the verb “*verrücken*”, meaning to move or change position.

There are three phases in the development of apophany (Seywert 1999): initially, there is a modification of the reference system, in which all components of the perceptual field enter into correlation with the subject who perceives them, though still in a confused manner. In the second phase, a meaning begins to establish itself—either the sense of being tested or the feeling of being in a movie scene where everything is deliberately arranged for them. Here, there is still an “as if”, where assuming an exogenous position is still possible. The third phase is the consolidation of evidence, where there is no room for doubt, marked by the full subjectivation of perception and the complete inversion of the intentional vector—translated into the belief that things are directed at the individual or that an external force is responsible for them. One lives in a receptive mode, where revelations are made to them. An example of subjectivation, from the excerpt above, was the belief

that if he shouted and concentrated, he could impose silence—a kind of solipsistic world configuration.

Objects are surrounded by a myriad of essences, which cannot be fully exhausted by everyday language or reduced to a single meaning. Conrad illustrates this with the doctor's white coat, speckled with blood stains, and the patient's certainty that he would be killed. That is, something in this experience leads the patient to infer an essence of “slaughterhouse” from the coat, even though it could convey numerous other essences, such as the sterility of white, the “desire to help” associated with the doctor, etc.—properly an “inexhaustible cloud of essential properties”. These essential properties (*Wesenseigenschaften*), subjectively constructed between the perceiver and the object itself, can be released in a delusion, such that an animal noise, as reported by Rainer, Conrad's model patient, signifies that he will be killed like an animal, or the grease droplets on the cheese indicate that he will have to sweat to prove himself. These contents derive their qualitative tone from the context in which they are embedded.

Here, we see a progression, according to the phases described above, in which the emergence of essential properties occurs in connection with the erosion of “texture properties” (*Gefügeeigenschaften*)—the properties of things inserted into a “natural perceptual connection” (Seywert 1999), within a natural attitude where things are embedded in shared reference systems, not ego-centered, where things are objectively ordered.

There is a transformation from an ontological experiential universe into a quasi-ontic nature (Sass 1992), thereby reestablishing coherence for the patient (curiously, delusion has meaning for the delusional individual, as suggested by the term “*Wahnsinn*”).

What happens, according to my reading of the dynamics of temporality and affection, as a continuation of the *trema*, is the constant tension of attraction exerted by protention, which does not fade as it should and elicits the persistent impression that something is about to happen, something is about to be revealed—like the expectation of a subsequent note in a melody that never materializes. This is also associated, as an effect of protention, with hypersalience—a myriad of perceptual details that likewise do not fade. This functional temporal modification affects transcendental intersubjective synchronization, bringing a solipsistic character to the apophanic experience. The constant tension is unsustainable, and a homeostatic arrangement emerges, in the form of a search

for meaning¹, leading to the emergence of a rigid meaning—since the possibility of assuming an eccentric position is compromised, usually self-referential, a product of this vector inversion, emanating from the essential properties of the surrounding situational elements.

At this point in the experience, the solipsistic character fosters a certainty distinct from the certainty of shared objectivity, of shaded profiles—it is a certainty that speaks more about the mental intricacies than about what is seen. For example, in the sentence “I see a bird”, one might doubt their perceptual certainty regarding the bird, the transcendent object here. However, in the reflective statement “I perceive that I see the bird”, one does not doubt that they perceive something. Solipsism is more aligned with this second type of conviction.

Following Conrad’s text, there is a section dedicated to **“Experiences of recognition and estrangement”**. Regarding recognition phenomena, he highlights numerous cases in which this occurs. Conrad emphasizes the role of facial similarities as foundational to this: “There must always be a certain resemblance, and this is precisely what leads to false recognition” (Conrad 1997, p. 99). Sometimes, a trait or detail serves as a bridge to declare this recognition, in an overlap of “physiognomic” aspects, which take precedence over “structural” aspects.

There are also experiences that move in the opposite direction, where the familiar is perceived as strange, such as in case 37: “He recoils in shock at his neighbor’s wife because she suddenly seems very different” or case 28: “The first times I went to the hospital kitchen to get food, each day it seemed different, as if it had been turned upside down, as if they had changed the placement of things” (Conrad 1997, p. 102). Conrad notes that perception can be permeated by an apophanic character of inauthenticity, but also that perceived objects can be imbued with “qualities of estrangement”, inversely to “qualities of familiarity”. He concludes that the highlighting of “essential properties” (*Wesenseigenschaften*) in delusional experience can lead to comparisons of physiognomies and the denial of identity.

I shall give another perspective on these phenomena of estrangement and recognition. The phenomenon of estrangement, in this hermeneutics of affection

¹ Conrad was influenced by V. von Weizsäcker’s work on the notion of *Gestaltkreis*, mediating the reorganization of meaning in response to an underlying neurological disturbance and the attempt to preserve a vital relationship with the environment (Mishara 2011).

modulating temporality, could be interpreted according to the primacy of the attractive “protentive” dimension, such that the sign of novelty-to-come could nullify the sedimented character of the previously known. On the other hand, Jae Sul (2022) points to *déjà vu/vecu* experiences as disturbances in the retention of prior retentions—that is, recognition translates the structural perspective of an experience that does not fade and remains active, alive.

At this point it is possible to support the argument for an ordering in this functional modification of affection in the sequence of phenomena described by Conrad. Assuming there is no randomness, we see that from *trema* to *apophany*, there is a trajectory of alterations concerning deeper layers of immanence, progressing from the retention of protention to the retention of primal impression and the retention of retention.

The expression of this dual traction of forces, one that excessively points toward the future, while the other fails to fade past experiences, manifests itself in the so-called “omnipotence experiences”. The former aspect, about the future, has already been discussed above—it is the universe of hypersalience that gradually constitutes itself as a strange, altered world, where things occur passively, orchestrated by an external force. The later, stemming from the failure to fade past experiences, paradoxically emerges as the perception that one is capable of intervening in this world in ways previously impossible—sometimes described as a “magical”. An example is given in the experience of a patient who believed that his act of urination could cause bombs to fall on England. Conrad believes that both acts share a similar essential property—the act of falling.

Perhaps an example will help illustrate this configuration. Consider the hypothetical sentence: “I see a bird”. In a normal consciousness operating within the natural attitude, the past dimension fades, such that removing the subject does not alter the meaning of the sentence. Additionally, the brightness of the protentive dimension diminishes, privileging the present moment related to the object in question—the bird. With a protention whose affective intensity does not fade, this vector turns toward a myriad of objects that appear passively in the visual field. A self-referential meaning gradually establishes itself, as the retention that does not fade would hypertrophy this “I”, creating a bizarre parallelism between a passive, externally imposed experience—though self-referential and active—with a sense of an omnipotent agency, of a hypertrophied “I”.

It is in the wake of this hypertrophy of the “I” that “Anastrophe” is discussed. This Greek term refers to “turning back” or “return”, and here it signifies the sensation, shared

by many patients, that “everything revolves around me”. Case number 50 illustrates this through persecutory features—while walking through the city, he felt observed, though he could not explain why. According to the author’s observation, the theme was influenced by the current situation, and since it was a wartime context, “espionage” became a common theme.

One passage stands out among the examples, particularly from Conrad’s model patient. In describing Rainer’s experience, Conrad notes that in an object-directed, non-reflective lived experience, “apophany” temporarily ceases. The revelation that he is being observed emerges through a reflective exercise—realizing that a false scenario has been staged to test him. Reflection, as discussed at the beginning of this work, is seminal to exploring psychic life. When I say “I think that I see a bird,” a dialectical tension arises between the distinct “I’s”—subject and object—sublated in a unified experience. The fact is that behind every act of consciousness, a pre-reflective “I” is imprinted, ensuring that I am the subject of my actions and experiences. However, in the presence of a retention that does not fade correctly—due to a diminished intensity of affectivity—these “I’s” are experienced as if both were clamoring for the intensity of a “now”, increasing their relative weight in a conscious experience. This would account for the sense of “self-reference”, but also for hyperreflexivity phenomena (Stanghellini 2003), understood here as an objectified monitoring of one’s own mental life, emerging at this moment and promoting a spatialization of mental life. The immanent world gains perspective. For this reason, Conrad asserts: “Apophany compels man to reflect to some extent” (Conrad 1997, p. 110). Initially, it is possible to silence apophany through transposition, but eventually, one becomes trapped in a “captivity of the self”, as the author describes.

The hyperreflexive phenomenon is particularly intriguing, as it does not foster any critical perspective on the individual’s state. Thus, Conrad describes it as “spasms of reflection.” It is not a genuine capacity for transposition in the sense of assuming an eccentric position, especially since, as argued above, the experience of desynchronization with alterity and the sensation of not belonging to a shared ground are central. Anastrophe is the antechamber of the fragmentation of self-experience, well captured by Bin Kimura (Kimura 1992), who saw in this apotheosis of the “I” an attempt to reestablish subjectivity at risk of disintegration.

At the end, Conrad says a few words on temporal structures and mood states. He believed that only long-duration processes and numerous episodes would produce

alterations in the experience of time. However, he highlights a case of rapid evolution and severity—Case 76 (Conrad 1997, p. 112). The patient believed he recognized everyone in the room: “They are all people who have already died”. When asked if they were dead, he replied: “No, at the moment they live again”. He further commented on time: “When one advances so far in time, things return to the first year of life... Everything moves backward...” or “I always have the age I have now, I have eternal life,” “I never die, the whole world knows me”, “I am Christ”. Case number 30 is even more explicit in stating that “time had stopped”. This excerpt marks a distinction between Conrad’s understanding of temporality and the perspective defended in this work. It is unequivocal that this is an alteration of temporality, though the unequivocal aspect does not lie in a subversion of objective, chronological temporality—when speaking of reliving or suspending a futurized teleology of time, of moving backward, which Conrad calls “the principle of relativity in the experience of time”. These expressions are temporal because, as argued earlier, they are assumed to be subsidiary to a functional temporal alteration, of a phenomenological temporal structure, which by now is no longer novel. Even the principle of relativity mentioned is not relative to objective temporality, as Conrad suggests, but rather to a desynchronization between phenomenological temporalities, due to an alteration in a dialectical processuality relative to a transcendental alterity. Through a phenomenological notion of temporality, it is possible to hypothesize that patient number 76 is in an anastrophic stage, as when he claims to be Christ, that he knows the entire world, evoking grandiosity and omnipresence—signs of this apotheosis of the “I”. Likewise, there is consonance with the style of temporal modification, of eternalization, of the failure to fade the retention of primal impression or retention of retention, and false recognition. Ultimately, Conrad does not apprehend the phenomena from their trematic onset as temporal, leading to the conclusion that his comments on time refer to objective temporality rather than a phenomenological one.

The apophany of inner space

The changes designated as inner space refer to intentional acts such as thinking and perceiving, which will be altered. Moreover, in line with what has been previously discussed, the reflective attitude will be of great relevance in understanding the phenomena described here.

In Conrad’s case studies, the pathological process followed a certain delimitation

between external and internal boundaries, progressing from the former to the latter. There are equally frequent cases in which both succumb simultaneously. However, rare are the cases in which there may be a compromise of inner space while preserving outer space, as in prophetic delusions, designated by Kleist as inspiration psychoses (Conrad 1997, p. 117).

What is relevant to the purposes of this study regarding inspiration psychosis is that thoughts seem to lose the pre-reflective imprint of an “I” and are perceived as “inspired”, interpreted as being transmitted like a kind of prophecy. Conrad hypothesizes that only certain thoughts are affected, especially those designated as “occurrences”, which sane individuals describe as “this occurs to me” rather than “I think”. He also highlights the role of reflective consciousness in the origin of these “occurrences”.

Ignoring the rare cases of primary inner compromise, we observe the progression suggested above—the chaining of phenomena in a given order of appearance. Until now, there was anastrophe and the heightened expression of the “I”, simultaneously with hyperreflexive phenomena, accompanied by the temporal impression of eternalization or hypostasis. However, it would not sound impertinent to suppose that in this reflective process of consciousness, each “I” imprinted in each act of consciousness fails to find synthesis in a unified “I”, leading to the emergence of influence phenomena, resembling external forces or revelations. These do not emerge with the “own mark” (*ipsis*) of this psyche. For example, in the sentence: “I perceive that I see a bird”, if there is no synthesis in a unified experience, and the “I” that perceives apprehends the “I” that sees the bird in an objectified manner, the experience will be one of influence, of an external agency in the act of seeing.

A phenomenon similar to “inspired” thought is thought diffusion. Some individuals, such as Case 11, claimed that others could hear their thoughts: “They hear my thoughts and everything I do”. Alongside this, there was thought insertion: “They wanted to put the word ‘lieutenant general’ in my head”. These patients are usually indelibly convinced that others hear their thoughts, though they cannot always justify this conviction to interlocutors. Sometimes, they base it on coincidences, such as thinking about lighting a cigarette and coincidentally seeing someone else light one.

To facilitate the argument, consider another example: “I perceive that I think about my tasks”. The “I” imprinted in the act of perceiving the other “I”, which thinks about a given content, is apprehended as distinct. This fragmentation of self-experience makes

thoughts still seem “own”, but distant—initially no longer confined to an intimate space. Conrad states: “Transparency is the first degree of the apophany of the actualized” (Conrad 1997, p. 128). However, as successive “I’s” accumulate due to the failure to fade primal impression retention and retention of retention, the distance of that thought from the “I”-pole, understood as the zero-point reference, increases—hence the possibility of perceiving this thought as inserted from outside. A later stage of this “morbid objectification” (Stanghellini 2003) is the experience of this thought as a voice. The so-called auditory hallucinations are experienced as a difference in degree, not in nature, stemming from the thought phenomena described above.

The fact that this universe consists of coincidences, juxtaposed fragments, with no loose pieces, fundamentally relates to the alteration of temporal synchronization and dysfunction in integrating transcendental intersubjectivity. Without the Other, there is no perspective of a horizon that opens itself as possibility, no apperception, only perception—hence the certainty.

It is interesting to note that in the apophany of the encountered, Conrad described the release of “essential properties”, interpreted here as a product of hypersalience originating from protention, resulting in analysis, fragmentation, and juxtaposed pieces amalgamated by delusional hermeneutics. What occurs in the apophany of the inner space is similar—equally fragmented—but involving intentional acts and the tacit “I” imprinted in each of these acts. For this reason, Conrad asserts: “They are merely two sides of the same process, that is, apophany” or what he calls “dedifferentiation of field structure” (Conrad 1997, p. 128), here referred to as analysis and fragmentation. At such a degree of dedifferentiation, a thought acquires sensory qualities, as in the case of thought sonorization and voices.

Returning to the beginning of the excerpt, the reflective attitude, which serves as the hermeneutic axis for the phenomena in question, is also evident in the content of voices, as they comment on the execution of actions—a kind of “retrospective attention”, narrating the individual’s actions. Another phenomenon, sometimes referred to as thought flow paralysis or detention, also appears as a product of the functional temporal alteration of affection, which fails to fade the retentions of primal impression and retention, culminating in the experience of hypostasis.

Finally, anomalous bodily sensations such as paresthesias, cutaneous sensations, fabricated movements, and sensations perceived as externally “produced” are described—

distinct from usual neurological senses but rather as an apophany invading the bodily sphere. When such sensations take center stage, Conrad highlights the cenesthetic variants, following Huber's notion (Conrad 1997). Cenesthesia is characterized as a global synthesizing experience of bodily sensations and all sensitivity that underpins consciousness, including the feeling of existence, of itself, and being separate from the world (Stanghellini 2009).

It may seem strange to introduce an excerpt about the body within this apophanic moment (of the inner space), which was discussing thoughts. However, there are points of connection. Conrad notes that one may be engaged in automatic, unreflective movements, harmoniously directed toward action in the natural attitude. However, he hypothesizes that apophany will affect only reflective movements, which will share the impression of external agency, similar to thoughts.

The tacit body, as a world-revealing possibility (*Leib*), then becomes an object (*Körper*). It loses its harmonic integrative unity, oriented toward world openness, and dedifferentiates into fragmented parts, thematized under the sign of external agency. For this reason, this also seems to be a limiting point regarding linguistic representations, which are usually absent—since language is a social construction, a trademark of an alterity that precedes even individual existence.

This appears to be a fundamental transformation, the antechamber of the apocalyptic phase, where the body becomes the last frontier against the pressure of temporal framework disintegration.

Apocalyptic stage

This phase encompasses the catatonic state as a later, deteriorated stage following apophany, making it difficult to explore due to its incomprehensible, incoherent manifestations and rigid corporeality. Reports about this phase are only possible when the patient recovers and attempts to establish some continuity in temporality, though often, what remains are mere fragments.

At this stage, one might indeed speak of a structural disarticulation of temporality, as it is impossible to organize the experience *in loco* in any intentional form, rendering it uncommunicable. Conrad highlights incomprehensible behaviors, highly volatile mood states, motor rigidity, an appearance as if “internal life were dead”, and a loss of continuity

in corporeality, with body parts transitorily disappearing. The author draws on the dynamics of dreams to approximate an understanding of this phase, though he admits that its essence remains elusive.

Given Conrad's meticulous tracking of the evolution of schizophrenia, it seems intuitive to say that catatonic psychosis represents a later stage of severity in the progression of the schizophrenic episode, following the apophanic phase, rather than merely an alternative presentation alongside the paranoid form. However, this was not the prevailing understanding at the time, and Conrad was responsible for proposing this perspective.

The apocalyptic phase may, in rare cases, evolve into a fatal acute form, leading to a comatose state that culminates in death. More commonly, however, there is a regressive movement, referred to as "consolidation".

One of the difficulties in postulating a structural disorder, rather than a functional one, is determining how reorganization occurs, given that the dismantling is far more fundamental. However, one point seems undeniable: this phase represents the paroxysm of the initial schizophrenic episode, whose evolution—described later—will not occur without some form of residual effect.

Consolidation

This is a regressive phase in which the possibility—at least partially—of assuming a hypothetical alterity is regained ("transposition has once again become possible") (Conrad 1997, p. 159). However, the movement is ambiguous, as there is an alternation between positions that regard delusion as an error and others that accept it as an unshakable truth. It is to the latter that the term "consolidation" owes its designation, as "apophanic penetration had slowly consolidated" (Conrad 1997, p. 156), and the delusional repertoire crystallizes and settles.

Conrad describes the psychoeducational process of helping the patient understand their illness as a "Copernican shift", in the sense of removing them from the center of the world. One could think that the mobilization of alterity finds some permeability, allowing the patient to assume an eccentric stance, overcoming the egocentric delusional version. Undoubtedly, this is a regressive evolution, in the sense of recovering a structure closer to sanity, but one that encounters resistance, which Conrad designates as "neurotic fixation

of delusion.”

However, how can one account for the temporal oscillation, this “is and is not”, which gives the impression of a regressive phase?

Shaun Gallagher (2000) may contribute to the answer by associating the malfunction of protentive mechanisms with specific contents, which could indeed affect the temporal structure of experience. Situations, individuals, memories, and fears could trigger the malfunction of protentive mechanisms, occurring in some circumstances but not others.

Perhaps the major factor driving the transition from apophany to consolidation is a situational change, moving away from a strongly catathymic past horizon, where a functional disruption of temporality prevailed—culminating in structural disorganization—toward a state with a functioning closer to an intact structure. This conflict may lead the patient into a certain confusion.

Residual state

The idea that there is no *ad integrum* restitution is not necessarily correlated with any form of delusional content. It refers to a personality alteration that certainly accounts for the distinct nature of an occasional second psychotic episode. There is something formal that lingers like a stain, like future insecurity, as described by the patient Rainer: “I no longer know, nor will I ever know in the future, if something is purely accidental. It is a paralyzing impression” (Conrad 1997, p. 163). He describes insecurity, immaturity in relation to others and the world, emptiness, an inability to be carefree, a lack of inner drive, a decision drive, or a lack of concentration, as he focuses on all objects in the field—as if residue from hypersalience. Ultimately, Conrad speaks of a loss of tension as a difficulty that arises in achieving an objective, as a decisional force or willpower.

Conrad uses the term “energy” or “tension force” in humans, analogous to physical forces, as a heuristic axis. As if all forms of intentionality occur in energetic terms—such as wanting, fearing, interests, and similar dynamics involving psychic energy. Tension arises before an objective, in a dual dynamic, where the individual directs themselves, but the world exerts an attraction tension. The key issue is that these systems interconnect, meaning, to pursue a given objective, others must be silenced (for instance, one cannot satisfy their thirst by drinking a glass of water while being mobilized by numerous other

tension systems that dilute intentionality). A given character is forged from this energy dynamic—it pertains to how one positions themselves before the world, where energy is applied, what is avoided, and the distribution of energy produced, which is constant: investing more in a given field decreases input for others.

Through this concept, Conrad argues that the residual state involves a reduction in energy potential, the clinical significance being that the patient no longer expresses desires, remains "still," without initiative. He draws a parallel with charcoal combustion, whose oxidation gradually reduces its energy potential, akin to a psychotic episode diminishing the individual's "energy potency."

We could hypothesize that in temporal terms, the residual aspect has a strong protentive character, similar to the Trema, though seemingly distinct in degree, not evoking the previous sense of imminent crisis. One might suppose that, in a universe where everything demands attention, directionality is lacking, making energy application highly costly, accounting for a certain asthenia. One could also interpret this sense of hypostasis as containing the retentive dimension previously mentioned, though not with the severity of an imminent fragmentation of self-consciousness.

Conclusion

Initially, the discussion aimed to situate incipient alterations that could evolve into a full-blown case of schizophrenia with psychotic changes. The intent of this symptomatological genealogy is not new, and the order of the appearance of certain phenomena does not occur anarchically, as Conrad (1997) and Klosterkötter (1992) mainly suggest.

Next, I exemplified, with some authors, that structural analysis of temporality occupies a central place in understanding schizophrenia. In summary, it is argued that schizophrenia entails a structural impairment of temporality (Fuchs 2007, 2013, 2017; Stanghellini 2016). Jae Sul (2022) questions the idea of structural collapse since intentional structure is temporal, which would imply the incommunicability of experience.

There is a gap in the current scientific literature regarding a detailed assessment of this genealogy from the perspective of a phenomenological temporal alteration, especially concerning Klaus Conrad's work (1997). More than that, I sought to interpret temporal alterations not in terms of structural changes but functional ones, using the concept of

affection (Sul 2022).

This is followed by a brief exposition of Conrad and the historical context of the crisis in the sciences in which his work is situated, as well as his innovative method, called Gestalt analysis. I also present some temporal premises regarding Husserl, with special emphasis on how the temporal flow encompasses a dialectic of introjection of alterity and how affection organizes the temporal flow of consciousness. The latter, in turn, does not constitute itself solipsistically but gives rise to an intra-subjective, transcendental intersubjectivity.

Based on this philosophical framework, I attempt to exemplify, using cardinal symptoms, the types of alterations occurring in each phase. Typically, in the Trema, there is no fading of the retention of protention, with its anxious undertone, followed by alterations that operate centripetally, such as retention of the primal impression and the sensation of hypostasis.

Apophany or revelation will revolve around a hermeneutic operating within these two poles of opposing tensions. Trema anomie gains meaning, usually self-referential and situational, according to Conrad, through the release of essential properties. The rigidity of delusional conviction or impossibility of transposition is due to a temporal characteristic, as intersubjective synchronization also depends on the functional temporal aspect modulated by affection. With desynchronization, there is an increasing movement toward a solipsistic, immanent universe. The alterations in this phase follow a pattern: first, protentive functional changes that move toward retentive ones, unveiling omnipotent experiences of anastrophe, hyper-reflexive, self-referential experiences, increasingly confined within an immanent universe until the rupture of “morbid objectification” (Stanghellini 2023), where thought loses the mark of selfhood and becomes dedifferentiated in the auditory hallucinatory phenomenon and bodily alterations, with the body losing its sense of “self.”

The typical catatonia of the apocalypse would be the only phase with a true disruption of temporality, making it impenetrable to the psychopathologist.

A regressive phase follows, with some temporal structuring, albeit not *ad integrum*, allowing the individual to critically evaluate their convictions, culminating in a residual state with attenuated protentive and retentive alterations.

In summary there seems to be a pattern of alterations that follows from protention

to retention and from transcendence towards immanence. Some questions remain to be formulated, such as how the temporal axis could be re-established after the severity of the apocalyptic phase. Considering the restoration of a structurally significant alteration is certainly more complex than a functional one. Perhaps the subsequent residual damage finds its basis precisely in this re-establishment. Another difficulty involves the consolidation and residual phases. Could one posit, for example, a gradation in the intensity of functional alterations—more severe in the initial phases and less intense in the final ones? If so, how would this occur?

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